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the record, then the writ of coram nobis will lie whether the
court has been misled through mistake or fraud.
CONCLUSION
This article is not intended as an attack on any of the decisions
of the courts, nor on the use of coram nobis. It is simply an
effort to call attention to the fact that the so-called law of coram
nobis still persists as a necessary part of the practice and pro-
cedure in Missouri. For our own purposes if it were felt that the
present day motion completely supplanted the old writ of error
coram nobis, it would seem that the rational procedure would
be to cease speaking in terms of coram nobis, but its language
has been carried through the books from Calloway v. Nifong145
to G. M. A. C. v. Lyman,16 of the present year. However, once
convinced of the propriety of the relief, there need be no worry
as to the mode of attaining it through the function of writ of
error coram nobis via the motion route. For this reason, the
granting of the motion should be exercised with the utmost cau-
tion and the grounds for the motion must be certain and definite,
and restricted to such cases as where the facts to be presented
are such that if those facts had been presented to the court at
the original trial, the judgment rendered would not have been
rendered.
J. CHARLES CRAWLEY '35.
IMPLIED POWERS OF LICENSE REVOCATION BY
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
I.
American legislatures in many instances have provided for the
licensing of business, trades and acts to be performed by indi-
viduals., Express legislative provisions for the revocation of
licenses are, however, "meager and haphazard." 2 "There is no
consistent legislative policy in any one jurisdiction concerning
revocability or non-revocability, grounds of revocation, character
of the revoking body, or appeal.... There are few fields in which
there is more room and need for doing constructive work in the
way of building up correct principles of legislation." Freund
says that the work would involve, among others, this question,
145 (1822) 1 Mo. 223.
146 (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d.) 109.
1 Freund, Police Power, sec. 493; "Current Legislation", 22 Col. L. Rev.
269.
2 Freund, Legislative Regulation, p. 294.
Ibid. See also Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Prop-
erty, sec. 64.
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"What is the law in cases where powers of revocation are not
expressly granted ?"4
This article will attempt, in some degree, to answer the pro-
posed question. The field is a limited one and concerns itself
only with the power of an administrative agency to revoke a
license which it has granted when the statute or ordinance by
virtue of which the agency acts does not expressly confer upon
the tribunal the power of revocation.5
Freund has aptly said, "There is no general rule analogous to
the federal rule concerning appointment to and removal from
office (Ex Parte Hennen 13 Pet. 230) to the effect that a licens-
ing power in the absence of a positive provision carries with it a
power to revoke the license." 6 Whether the revocation of a license
by an administrative body will be upheld in the courts depends
on several factors, including: 1. the type of activity licensed; 2.
the giving of notice and the opportunity for a hearing preceding
the revocation; 3. the presence of provisions in the license itself
for revocation; 4. the presence of sanctions, other than revoca-
tion, in the statute or ordinance for the enforcement of the terms
of the license. In general, however, the cases may be classified
into two categories. In the first group are those cases involving
the revocation of a license which was granted to authorize the
carrying on of an activity which bears a close relation to the
public health, morals, or safety. Licenses in such cases may be
termed"privilege licenses" and include, for example, licenses to
operate a saloon or dairy or to use the public streets for a private
purpose. The second group of cases includes those in which a
license has been granted authorizing the doing of an act or acts
in regard to real property and in which there has been a revoca-
tion. To distinguish licenses in the latter group from the former
they may be termed "property licenses." A typical example is
the ordinary building permit.
II.
In cases involving "privilege licenses" the revocation by an
administrative agency is generally upheld. In a New York case7
7 Metropolitan Milk and Cream Co. v. City of New York et al. (1906)
113 App. Div. 377, 98 N. Y. Supp. 894, aff. 186 N. Y. 533, 78 N. E. 1107.
A fine for the violation of the conditions of the license was provided in the
ordinance. Previously in People ex rel. Lieberman v. Vandecarr (1903)
175 N. Y. 440, 67 N. E. 913 the validity of the licensing provisions had
been upheld.
4 Ibid. p. 295.
5 This eliminates questions in regard to 1) the power of a legislative body
to revoke by statute or ordinance a license which it has granted by the same
means; 2) the power of a municipality to provide for the revocation of
licenses when the statute or charter under which it operates provide for
licensing but contain no provision as to revocation.
e Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, p. 117.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss3/6
NOTES
the Department of Health of the City of New York, after notice
and hearing, revoked a license to sell milk and the revocation
was upheld. The court said, "The sole authority that the health
board would have if this contention8 was correct, would be to
prosecute the person selling the poisonous article in the shape of
milk, fine it, and in the meantime such person could go on poison-
ing the people under a permit or license from the health author-
ities, a proposition which is so unreasonable that a mere state-
ment is sufficient to refute it.... To hold that a permit once
granted is irrevocable would be to totally defeat the object of
the statute in requiring such a permit before a person should
engage in the business of supplying to the inhabitants of a city
food."9 The practical reason behind the decision is clear and
should have been a sufficient basis on which to rest the decision,
but the court found another basis. The license itself provided
that the Department of Health could revoke the license at its
pleasure and the court held that since the licensee accepted the
provision as a part of the license he could not contend that the
license was irrevocable.,' This basis may be termed the "agree-
ment theory."
The latter basis for the decision in the New York case is the
usual one given in cases involving "privilege licenses" and seems
to be the main basis for the results." In but one case where a
"privilege license" was revoked has the "agreement theory" been
8 The defendant's contention that the license was irrevocable and that the
only thing the board could do was impose the fine provided in the ordinance.
9 Supra note 6, 113 App. Div. 1. c. 381, 98 N. Y. Supp. 1. c. 897.
TO Ibid. A later New York case, People ex rel. Lodes v. The Department
of Health of the City of New York (1907) 189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187,
approved the Metropolitan Milk and Cream Co. case and further held that
no notice or hearing was necessary before the board could revoke the license.
There was a dissenting opinion.
11 Malkan v. City of Chicago (1905) 217 Ill. 471, 75 N. E. 548. The
revocation of a license to sell intoxicating liquor was sustained. The court
said that the licensee "accepted the license with the provision in it that it
was subject to revocation at the discretion of the mayor. By thus accepting
the license he assented to its terms and conditions." This statement was the
sole ground for the decision on the point with which this article is concerned.
In People ex rel. Van Norder v. Sewer etc. Commission of the Village of
Saratoga Springs (1904) 90 App. Div. 555, 86 N. Y. Supp. 445, the court
upheld the revocation of a hackman's license and the sole ground for the
decision was the "agreement theory." In the City of Grand Rapids v.
Braudy (1895) 105 Mich. 670, 64 N. W. 29, the court sustained the revoca-
tion of a junk dealer's license on the "agreement theory." In Sarlo v.
Pulaski County (1905) 76 Ark. 336, 88 S. W. 953, a case involving the
revocation of a liquor license, the court upheld the revocation on two
grounds: 1) the "agreement theory" and 2) an implied power of revocation
derived from the power of prohibition granted the administrative agency.
This latter case is the only case which speaks of an implied power of
revocation.
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entirely disregarded. 12 The ground for the decision in that case
seems to have been that the power of an administrative official
to approve is a continuous one "in the sense that under appropri-
ate circumstances the approval may and should be withdrawn. 1 3
There is another possible ground for the decision, namely that
the matter affected public health (since a food product was in-
volved) and that for the practical reason mentioned in the
Metropolitan Milk and Cream Co. case14 it was best to allow the
administrative official to rescind his approval.
Although the cases generally follow what the writer has chosen
to call the "agreement theory", it does not seem that such a basis
for the decisions is a sound one. The question at once arises as
to the power of the administrative tribunal to impose as a part
of the license a provision for revocation. The better rule seems
to be that an administrative body may not put terms or condi-
tions in a license in the absence of statutory authority; for to do
so would be an unauthorized act.1 If this rule be followed, then
in all the cases considered the licensing agency had no authority
to impose as part of the license a provision for revocation.10
This means that the provision imposed was inoperative,1 7 and,
consequently, there was no reason to deny the licensee the right
to contest the validity of the revocation, even though he accepted
the license with the provision in it. Moreover, if the power of
an administrative tribunal to provide for revocation is recog-
nized, the door is open to the inclusion of numerous restrictions
in licenses which would amount to an exercise of legislative
power that ought not to be taken to have been conferred by im-
plication. 8
'
2 Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co. (1919 249 U. S. 495. The Sec. of
Agriculture withdrew his approval of a trade name for oleomargarine be-
cause a change in ingredients made the name misleading.
21 Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, p. 113.
The theory of the Blanton Mfg. Co. case could have been applied also in
Metropolitan Milk and Cream Co. v. City of New York, supra note 7, and
People ex rel. Lodes v. The Department of Health of the City of New York,
supra note 10.
14 Supra note 7.
1s Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, p. 113 and
cases cited. See also Drew County v. Bennett (1884) 43 Ark. 364; State
of West Virginia ex rel. Haddad v. City of Charleston (1922) 92 W. Va. 57,
114 S. E. 378, 27 A. L. R. 323.
s A distinction must be made between those licensing boards which have
a rule making power and under it may make a valid rule for revocation of
licenses (cf. Miller v. Johnson et al. (1921) 110 Kan. 135, 202 Pac. 619) and
those licensing boards which have little or no rule making power which
nevertheless impose revocation provisions in licenses. It is with the latter
type of board that this article is concerned. The validity of the rules for
revocation of the former type of board will depend largely on the scope of
rule making power granted the board; a problem which is not within the
purview of this article. See Miller v. Johnson, supra.
11 Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, p. 113.
18 Cf. Thompson v. Gibbs (1896) 97 Tenn. 489, 492, 37 S. W. 277, 278.
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A license by a municipality to use the public streets is also a
type of "privilege license." Its revocation presents a slightly
different problem. The general rule seems to be that a city,
absent a charter provision or a statute, has no power to grant a
permanent right to use the public streets for a private purpose,
and that, hence, any license to use the streets in such a manner
must necessarily be temporary and revocable. 9 Following this
rule, since the city council itself by ordinance may not grant a
permanent right, it has been held that an administrative agency
of the city, authorized to issue licenses for the use of the streets,
may revoke a license so granted, although express power of
revocation was not conferred upon it.2 ° In another case2 ' the
defendant had been granted a permit to use a public street for
the purpose of maintaing a scale thereon. After the defendant
had incurred expense in reliance upon the permit there was an
attempted revocation of the license. The court, however, did not
sustain the rescission, holding, "The license having been granted
by authority, and the defendants having acted thereon, as stated,
the plaintiff is estopped from revoking it until the interests of
the public shall require that it be revoked.122 This case while
holding that one who has incurred liabilities in reliance upon a
permit to use the public streets is entitled to use them so long as
such use does not interfere with the public interest, nevertheless
recognizes that there is no power in the city council (here acting
as an administrative body) to grant a permanent use to the
licensee. Thus in the ultimate view this case also follows the
general rule and is not necessarily in conflict with the Union
Institution for Savings case.
Hm.
There remain for consideration cases involving the revoca-
tion of "property licenses' ' 2s A Washington case24 is illustrative.
The relator was granted a permit to erect a stable and he im-
mediately made arrangements for construction. He had pro-
19 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations (2nd ed. 1928) secs.
1422 & 1423; Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations
(5th ed. 1911) sec. 1176; Laing v. Americus (1891) 86 Ga. 756, 13 S. E.
107; Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator (1884) 82
Mo. 121.
20 Union Institution for Savings in the City of Boston v. City of Boston
(1916) 224 Mass. 286, 112 N. E. 637. A permit granted to the plaintiff to
maintain a post with a clock set thereon in the silkwalk was revoked.
21 Incorporated Town of Spencer v. Andrew et al. (1891) 82 Iowa 14,
47 N. W. 1007.
22 Ibid. 82 Iowa 1. c. 18, 47 N. W. 1. c. 1008. See also Henman v. Clarke
et al. (1907) 121 App. Div. 105, 105 N. Y. Supp. 725. A case involving the
revocation of a permit to move two houses along the public streets.
2a See p. 2.
24 State ex rel. Grimmer v. City of Spokane (1911) 64 Wash. 388, 116
Pac. 878.
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ceeded so far as to have lumber hauled upon the premises, when
he received a notice that his permit was about to be revoked, and
that he should appear at a hearing. In consequence he brought
an action to prohibit the defendant, The Board of Public Works,
from revoking the permit. Judgment was given for the relator,
the court holding, "It seems to us that when the board heard the
relator's application for this building permit upon its merits and
thereafter granted it, its power in the premises was exhausted.
Any other rule would make a building undertaking of this nature
rather a perilous undertaking on the part of the one procuring
the permit. We think that after a fair hearing and the granting
of the permit there, in the absence of fraud on the part of the
applicant, he has a right to presume that the matter is finally
determined in so far as his rights under the ordinance and the
permit are concerned." 25 As in the "privilege license" cases, the
practical reason for the decision is clear, and the cases are gen-
erally in accord with the Washington result.28
It should be noted that in the Washington case the relator had
actually made preparations for construction, and this is true in
all of the cases.2 7 The incurring of liabilities in reliance upon the
permit is noteworthy because the express theory behind two of
the decisions and the general idea running through all the cases
is that when the licensee enters upon the construction of a build-
ing or incurs liabilities in reliance upon the permit he acquires
a vested right of which the administrative tribunal has no power
to deprive him.2 8 Two cases adopt a slightly different theory in
this regard. They say that where such circumstances exist "it
must be held that the city is estopped to claim that the permit
has been revoked."29 The writer has been unable to find any case
25 Ibid. 64 Wash. 1. c. 394, 116 Pac. 1. c. 880.
28 Lowell v. Archambault (1905) 189 Mass. 70, 75 N. E. 65; Rehman v.
City of Des Moines (1925) 200 Iowa 286, 204 N. W. 267, 40 A. L. R. 922;
The City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne (1892) 134 N. Y. 163, 31 N. E. 443;
General Baking Co. v. Street Com'rs of Boston (1922) 242 Mass. 194, 136
N. E. 245; McPherson v. Board of Street Com'rs. of Boston (1925) 251
Mass. 34, 146 N. E. 244; Pratt v. City and County of Denver (1922) 72
Colo. 51, 209 Pac. 508; Williams v. Smith (1925) 77 Colo. 572, 238 Pac. 40;
Gallagher v. Flury (1904) 99 Md. 181, 57 At]. 672; People ex rel. Evens v.
Kleinert (1922) 201 App. Div. 751, 195 N. Y. Supp. 711; Fuller v. Schwab
(1925) 208 N. Y. Supp. 289.
27 Supra note 26. In some of the cases, e. g., Lowell v. Archambault &
The City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne supra note 26 not only had preparations
been made but actual construction was started before the attempted revoca-
tion.
28 People ex rel. Evens v. Kleinert supra note 26, 201 App. Div. 1. c. 755
195 N. Y. Supp. 1. c. 714; The City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne supra note 26,
134 N. Y. 1. c. 165, 31 N. E. 1. c. 444.
29Pratt v. City and County of Denver supra note 26, 72 Colo. 1. c. 54,
209 Pac. 1. c. 509; Williams v. Smith supra note 26. See also Fuller v.
Schwab supra note 26.
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in which the attempted revocation occurred before the licensee
assumed liabilities in reliance upon the permit.30
There exist two other possible bases for the decisions in a few
of the cases. As a general rule notice and hearing must be af-
forded by the administrative agency before it may deprive one
of a property right through administrative action.31 If it be
held 2 that the licensee acquires a property right when he assumes
liabilities in reliance upon a permit, then under the general rule
the administrative body may not revoke the permit without a
notice and hearing. In at least three cases3 3 no notice and hear-
ing were afforded, and it would seem that in those cases a proper
basis for the decisions would be the absence of the requisite
procedure. The cases do little more than mention the point. In
another case" the licensing authority had power to revoke a
building permit for certain enumerated causes, none of which
applied to the licensee. The decision in that case, not sustaining
the revocation, very easily could have been grounded on the gen-
eral rule that "where a statute or ordinance authorizes the re-
vocation of a license for enumerated causes, the license cannot
be revoked by the administrative officer on any ground other than
the causes specified in the statute."3 5 The case, however, was
grounded on the usual point that the licensee had obtained a
vested right of which the administrative agency had no power
to deprive him.3 6
IV.
The decisions in the two classes of cases seem to be practical
though the grounds on which they are based vary and are not
satisfactory in all instances."7 In the "privilege license" cases it
, In General Baking Co. v. Street Com'rs. of Boston, supra note 26, that
situation was specifically excepted from the decision.
31 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States, sec. 1144.
The exception to the general rule is that notice and hearing are not neces-
sary when the public need is urgent or when administrative efficiency or
effectiveness are hampered by the procedure. Clearly this exception does not
apply to building permits, though it will justify the holding in People ex rel.
Lodes v. The Department of Health of the City of New York supra note 10.
32 Supra note 28.
33 The City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, General Baking Co. v. Street Com'rs.
of Boston, and Gallagher v. Flury supra note 26.
34 People ex rel. Evens v. Kleinert supra note 26. The Building Code of
the City of New York provided, "The superintendent of buildings may re-
voke any permit or approval .... in case of any false statement or any
misrepresentation as to a material fact in the application on which the
permit or approval was based." 201 App. Div. 1. c. 755, 195 N. Y. Supp.
1. c. 714.
35 Comment, 1 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 122 and cases cited. See also Stone v.
Fritts (1907) 169 Ind. 361. 82 N. E. 792; Commonwealth v. Mary Moylan
(1875) 119 Mass. 109.
36 Supra note 28.
37 Supra notes 15 and 16.
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is clear, as pointed out in the Metropolitan Milk and Cream Co.
decision,3 8 that if an administrative body could not validly re-
voke a license a licensee could continue with impunity39 to en-
danger the public and the sole thing the board could do would be
to impose penalties which the law provided, but the administra-
tive body could not eradicate the harmful business. Obviously,
however, what is needed is not the imposition of penalties but a
rapid elimination of the activity and it seems that the best way
to effect that end is to allow the administrative agency to revoke
the license summarily,40 and to provide an appeal to the courts to
determine whether or not the administrative tribunal acted ar-
bitrarily.41 This is the usual procedure in the cases 42 and hence
it seems that a satisfactory result was reached from the view-
point of public administration.
With reference to the "property license" decisions it also seems
that a practical result was attained. In those cases there is no
need for the quick action so necessary in the "privilege license"
decisions since the public is not vitally affected. Moreover, when
the licensee has actually acted in reliance upon the license, with-
out violating any of its terms or any ordinance,43 there seems to
be no legitimate reason why an administrative agency should be
allowed to revoke the license. In general then, it appears that the
decisions in both types of cases are based upon a policy which
makes for a desired public administration of the licensed activity.
ABE J. GALLANT '36.
36 Supra note 7.
3 9 Limited by but two things exclusive of penalties provided in the licens-
ing law: 1. possible suits brought by individuals personally affected; 2.
abolition of the activity as a nuisance (cf. City of Revere v. Riseman (1932)
280 Mass. 76, 181 N. E. 716).40 Freund disagrees with this. See his Administrative Powers Over Per-
sons and Property, p. 126.41 People ex rel. Lodes v. The Department of health of the City of New
York, supra note 10.
42 Supra note 11.
43 The writer has been uable to find cases wherein such circumstances
existed.
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